Lebanon

Union of Lebanon
Lubnaan (لبنان)

Official Language	Lebanese dialect of Arabic, Syriac, French
Other Languages	Syrian Arabic, Modern Standard Arabic, Judæo-Arabic, Armenian, French, Greek, Sabir (Mediterranean Lingua Franca), Turkish
Largest Religions	Druze, Eastern Orthodox Church (Antioch Patriarchate), Maronite Catholic Church, Shia Islam, Sunni Islam
Other religions	Assyrian Church of the East, Catholicism (Armenian and Latin Rites), Judaism, Oriental Orthodox Church (Armenian Apostolic Church, Syriac Orthodox)
Capital	Baakleen (Administrative and executive capital), Deir al-Qamar (Legislative and Judicial capital)
Largest City	Beirut
President	TBD
Prime Minister	TBD
Area
Population	7,519,438 (2024 estimate)
Government	Parliamentary democracy and federal republic
Independence	1923 (From the Ottoman Empire)
Currency	Dirham/Drachma (₯); 1 Dirham=100 fils (فلس)
Organizations	League of Mediterranean and Pontic Peoples, Community of Hellenophone States

Long dominated by the members of the Druze faith, Lebanon today is ruled by a highly secular government which seeks to protect all ethnic and religious groups within its territory.

Along with much of the rest of the Middle East, Lebanon regained its independence in the 1920's due to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Lebanon's government structure has worked remarkably well at uniting the country's diverse groups into one unified multicultural nation. In the early days of the modern Lebanese Union, many people expected the country to devolve into civil war (like *here*); Lebanon's peaceful history and flourishing economy have proven them wrong, however. While much of the Middle East makes money off of historical, archeological, and religious tourism, as well as oil and/or agriculture depending on area, Lebanon's open, cosmopolitan blend of cultures has made it into the "party country" of the Eastern Mediterranean - full of beaches, nightlife, casinos, and beautiful people. It is also known as a tax haven and international banking center where the world's wealthy and sneaky keep their secret bank accounts.

Religion

Religion is a very important topic when understanding Lebanese history and politics. The country has a careful balance of similar numbers of Druze (the founders of the state), Christians, and Muslims. Formerly, the Druze merely allowed people of other religions to live on what they perceived solely their land, and the Ottomans used divide-and-rule tactics to govern the coastal Levant by pitting all religious denominations against each other, which certainly didn't help ease tensions between the Druze, Maronites, and Sunnis. However, like with the Kurds, the Young Turks movement and Lebanese independence movement during the breakup of the Ottoman Empire helped bring about a degree of cohesion amongst the coastal Arabs, be they Christians, Muslims, Jews, or Druze. Post-independence, as the state looked to distance itself from the theocratic monarchy of Turkey, the Lebanese Republic began implementing political and economic reforms based on the French model, which included the prevention of religious groups influencing public policy. This has seen varying degrees of success, with the Druze most open to and in favor of complete secularization, and the Sunnis most opposed. The Maronite patriarchate still acts like a state-within-a-state and the Sunnis still revere the caliph in Gordion as their religious sovereign, but overall Lebanon is one of very few of the countries of the Middle East to actually enshrine the right to change religions in their constitution and is the most committed to the very Western notion of laïcité, something its pan-Arabist neighbor Syria is not so keen on doing. There is a very popular Druze saying that started amongst Druze freedom fighters in Syria that goes "Religion is for God, the fatherland is for all."

Lebanon is perhaps the only region in the entire Ottoman Empire where converts from Islam to Christianity were permitted. The most prominent example was the Shihab ruling dynasty that has always been a power player in Lebanese politics. The dynasty (allegedly) originated in the Hijaaz region but moved during the rise of the Islamic state to the Levant after its capture from the Roman Empire in the 600's. The clan is quite large, but more branches converted to Maronite Catholicism in the early 1700's than stayed Sunni Muslim or became other religions such as Orthodox Christianity.

Statistics

(Population: 7,519,438)

Religion

• Druze (32.44%): 2,439,306
• Christian (40.28%): 3,028,830
  • Catholic (49.08%): 1,486,624
    • Maronite (94.08%): 1,398,582
    • Latin (3.25%): 48,300
      • 5,284 are ethnic Armenians
    • Armenian (2.67%): 39,742
  • Eastern Orthodox (43.25%): 1,309,970
  • Oriental Orthodox (6.31%): 190,984
    • Syriac Orthodox (%): 108,038
    • Armenian Orthodox (%): 22,514
    • Coptic and Ethiopian Orthodox (%): 60,432
  • Assyrian Church of the East (1.36%): 41,252
• Muslim (26.84%): 2,018,216
  • Shia (68.4%): 1,367,034
    • Twelver Jafari Shia (%):
    • Alawites (%):
    • Ismaili/Sevener Shia (23%): 459,694
  • Shafi’i and Hanafi Sunni (31.6%): 631,634
• Other (.44%): 33,086
  • Jews (.1%): 7,876
  • Zoroastrians: 7,692
  • Yezidis, Yarsanis, Mandaeans, Manicheans: 10,824
  • Buddhists, Hindus, Xinto, etc: 6,626
  • Mormons: 68

Administration

Government

HOW GOVERNMENT IS ORGANIZED

Administrative Divisions

LIST OF ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

History

The Levant's Shifting Sands: An Alternate History of Lebanon (c. 10th - 16th Century and Beyond)

The trajectory of Lebanon, and indeed the entire Levant, diverged significantly from our world's history following the sustained dominance of the Fatimids as the regional power. Unlike in our timeline, the Fatimid Caliphate, centered in Cairo, was never toppled by a resurgent Sunni movement led by Saladin. Whether by the timely intervention of the historical Assassins or another twist of fate, Saladin's rise was preempted, ensuring the uninterrupted reign of the Fatimids. This absence of the Ayyubid and later Mamluk Sunni dynasties meant that the Levant never experienced the dramatic Sunni pushback that historically reshaped its religious demographics.

A Shi'a-Dominated Levant and the Evolution of the Druze

With the Fatimids maintaining their Isma'ili Shi'a orthodoxy as the official religion, the ground was fertile for the proliferation of various Shi'a branches. Isma'ili Shi'ism naturally flourished, becoming the dominant Muslim current in urban centers and regions directly under Fatimid control. Simultaneously, Twelver Shi'ism, which historically had pockets in the Levant, particularly in Jabal Amil (southern Mount Lebanon) and the Alawite mountains of coastal Syria, found a more permissive environment to expand and solidify its presence, never facing the intense persecutions that drove many Twelver scholars and communities into isolation or later into Iran. Sunni Islam, consequently, remained a significant minority, relegated to specific merchant communities or remnants of older populations, rather than achieving its historical majority status. Crucially, the Druze faith, which emerged directly from Isma'ili Shi'ism during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah (996-1021 AD), developed in a far more favorable environment. With continuous Fatimid suzerainty, the initial proselytization efforts for the nascent Druze movement were more sustained and widespread. This allowed for larger and more numerous Druze communities to become firmly established, not just in their traditional mountain strongholds of Mount Lebanon and Mount Hermon, but potentially in other secluded areas across the Levant. While the faith would still "close" to new converts as in our timeline, its foundational base of adherents was considerably larger, ensuring a much more robust demographic footprint. The esoteric and secretive nature of the Druze, while inherent to their theology, might have developed with slightly less defensive urgency compared to a world where they faced consistent persecution from a dominant Sunni power, though their distinctiveness from mainstream Isma'ilism would always necessitate a veiled tradition.

The Enduring Crusader States: Propped Up by Italian Power (13th Century - Early 16th Century)

The pivotal Fourth Crusade in this timeline never veered to Constantinople. Instead, under fervent Papal and strong Venetian leadership, the massive Crusader army and fleet sailed directly for the Levant as originally intended (1202-1204 AD). Acre was swiftly and decisively reinforced, and the Crusade proceeded to strike at the heart of the Fatimid Sultanate in Egypt. This crippling blow, combined with sustained pressure, led to the recapture and firm holding of Jerusalem early in the 13th century. Constantinople, untouched, remained a vibrant, if embattled, imperial capital, occasionally offering diplomatic or limited military support to the Crusader states against common threats. This successful Fourth Crusade reshaped the political landscape, allowing the Crusader states, now including a firmly held Jerusalem, to endure for centuries, continuously propped up by a unique confluence of interests:

Italian Mercantile Hegemony

The Italian city-states (Venice, Genoa, Pisa, Florence, Amalfi) became even more deeply invested. Their "factories" (trading posts), warehouses, and merchant fleets dominated the Levantine ports of Acre, Tripoli, Beirut, and Tyre. They evolved into de facto political and financial pillars, underwriting fortifications, supplying mercenaries, and influencing dynastic successions. The immensely lucrative Silk Road trade, flowing through their Levantine entrepôts, became too vital to abandon.

French and Papal Patronage

France maintained its traditional role as the primary European secular patron, sending periodic waves of knights, funds, and even new settlers. The Papacy, buoyed by the restored Kingdom of Jerusalem, consistently championed the Crusader states, issuing indulgences and funding fortifications.

Alliances and Survival

The Crusader states learned to navigate regional power shifts. They formed pragmatic alliances with the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, sharing a common Christian front. They cleverly played the Mongol Empire against the Fatimid rulers during periods of Ilkhanate influence, gaining crucial breathing room. This intricate diplomacy and sustained external support allowed them to weather repeated Fatimid onslaughts that, in our history, proved fatal to earlier Crusader gains.

A Robust "Franco-Levantine" Identity and the Ottoman Storm (1520s-1540s)

By the early 16th century (circa 1520s), the Crusader states boasted a substantial Latin Rite Catholic population, reaching approximately 35% of their total population. This was far more than a mere military garrison; it was a deeply rooted and distinct society known as the "Franco-Levantines." This identity was a rich tapestry. Crusader Descendants: Generations born and raised in the Levant, often speaking a unique patois blending Levantine French, Italian, and Arabic. They adopted local customs in food and dress while retaining their Latin Christian faith and a strong sense of European heritage. Italian Merchant Families: Powerful dynasties from Venice, Genoa, and other Italian cities, many residing for centuries, deeply entrenched in trade and intermarrying with other Latin families and even some local Greek Orthodox families. Native Converts: A significant minority of local Christians (Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox) and even some former Muslims, drawn to the Latin Church through intermarriage, economic opportunity, or genuine conviction. Their cultural assimilation varied, further enriching the "Franco-Levantine" cultural melange. The long Fatimid-Crusader stalemate was finally broken by the rising power of the Ottoman Empire. Having consolidated its power in Anatolia and Egypt (historically 1516-1517), the Ottoman juggernaut, now delayed and intensified for the Crusader states, turned its full might upon the Levant over a protracted period in the 1520s-1540s. The centuries-old Crusader fortifications, designed and maintained with European expertise, put up a ferocious, prolonged resistance. However, the Ottomans' overwhelming numerical superiority, disciplined bloc of Turkicnraiders, and advanced artillery proved unstoppable. One by one, Jerusalem, Tripoli, Beirut, and the other coastal strongholds fell after brutal sieges, often marked by massacres and destruction. The Italian city-states, weakened by costly European wars and the economic repercussions of the Age of Discovery (which shifted trade routes), found their resources stretched thin. While they sent naval aid and limited reinforcements, it was insufficient against the full force of the Ottoman war machine. France and the Papacy, similarly distracted by internal conflicts and the nascent Reformation, could not mount a decisive intervention. Emergency Measures: Absorption and Conversion: With the fall of their bastions, the "Franco-Levantine" Catholics faced an existential crisis. Two primary, and vastly different, survival strategies emerged. Absorption into the Maronite Church and Extreme Latinization (The Papal Mandate): The Papacy, desperate to preserve its loyal Latin flock, orchestrated a clandestine and unprecedented move. A secret Papal bull was issued, declaring a temporary and urgent spiritual absorption of all Latin Rite Catholics in the Levant into the Maronite Church. This was not a theological conversion but a pragmatic act of "ecclesiastical asylum." The Maronites, an Eastern Catholic Church in full communion with Rome, were already known for their resilience and their historical ability to maintain their faith in the Lebanese mountains. Rationale: The Maronites were already Catholic and loyal to Rome. Many Franco-Levantines, especially those of native convert or mixed heritage, already had some familiarity with Arabic or local Levantine dialects, easing linguistic assimilation. The Maronite heartland in Mount Lebanon offered natural refuge and a history of relative autonomy. By officially joining the Maronite rite, Franco-Levantines took sanctuary under the omophorion of the powerful Maronite patriarch, making them less distinguishable to the Sunni Ottoman authorities as a distinct "Latin" or "Frankish" remnant. Both Latin and Maronite priests and bishops were instructed by Rome to guide their joint flocks to mountain villages in the northerly districts of Mount Lebanon. Mass integrations were performed quickly due to urgency without explaining the new Maronite liturgical praxis and differences to the panicked faithful. This act was presented by the Papacy not as a surrender, but as a strategic retreat and a testament to Catholic unity. A "Hidden" Latin Legacy and Profound Liturgical Alteration: The Maronite Church in Lebanon experienced a massive, unprecedented influx of new adherents. Their liturgy and traditions underwent a profound and permanent Latinization, far beyond what occurred in our timeline, making them virtually indistinguishable from Latin Catholic liturgical life and praxis. The Vatican, eager to solidify this union and aid the massive new Maronite flock, swiftly printed the first standardized copies of the Maronite Qurbano (Divine Liturgy) on its printing presses. Crucially, the base for this new Qurbana was the Tridentine Latin Rite, meticulously translated into Syriac (not Arabic), with only the few unique Maronite Anaphoras (Eucharistic Prayers) painstakingly shoehorned into the rigid structure of the Tridentine Mass. Furthermore, the Latin liturgical calendar was universally adopted, replacing the traditional Maronite calendar. Donations of Latin-style liturgical items such as rosaries, monstrances for Eucharistic adoration, and new forms of priestly vestments, all made in the West, became standard. This complete absorption permanently altered the Maronite identity, ensuring their liturgical life, spiritual praxis, & outward appearance became much more Latinized than even in real life, solidifying their role as the primary Eastern bastion of Catholicism within the Ottoman Levant. Many Maronite families in this alternate history proudly bear Arabized Crusader surnames reflecting their Frankish or Italian origins, such as al-Tulusi (from Toulouse), al-Shambani (from Champagne), al-Janawi (from Genoa), al-Bunduqi (from Venice), or more generally al-Firanj (the Frankish one). These names, like Douahiy (from Dweihy), became markers of a "hidden" Latin legacy within the Maronite fold. These surnames however can be found not just amongst the Catholics of Lebanon but amongst some Rûm Orthodox as well. The Seven Greek Orthodox Families of Beirut in real life are ten in Ill Bethisad—Bustros (بسترس), Rebeiz (ربيز), Dagher (zed), Fayad (zed), Sarsagh (سرسق), Trad (zed), Tueni (zed), Batasi (البطاسي), Qantaquzi (القنطقوزي), and al-Araguni (الأراغوني). Conversion to Islam (The Pragmatic Choice): As Nassim Nicholas Taleb observed in our world's history, conversion often offers immediate safety and the potential for continued prosperity. For a greatly increased number of Franco-Levantines, approximately 10-15% of the former Latin Catholic population, especially among the wealthy urban elite, landed gentry, and politically savvy families, embracing Sunni Islam became a calculated act of survival. Integration into the Ottoman Elite: These converts, often with existing administrative experience, mercantile networks, and local knowledge, were highly valuable to the new Ottoman administration. They were granted land, positions, and titles within the new order. Betraying their Frankish faith, they adopted Turkish or Arabic first names upon nominal conversion to Islam, and quickly integrated into the new Sunni elite of the Levant. Their descendants became indistinguishable from other prominent Muslim families in the region, their Crusader past a novel footnote in their family trees. This phenomenon was far more widespread and impactful than in our history, fundamentally altering the demographic and socio-religious landscape of the Levant.

The Rise of Mount Lebanon and Druze Dominance

Within this new Ottoman-Druze-Shi'a-Orthodox dominated Levant, Mount Lebanon retained its traditional role as a refuge for diverse communities, though its internal dynamics shifted dramatically. The Druze, with their stronger demographic base and more solidified communities due to sustained Fatimid influence, avoided the historical conflicts that led to their demographic decline.

Ottoman-Druze Symbiosis

The Ottomans, having faced a difficult and prolonged conquest of the Crusader states, recognized the strategic importance of cultivating strong, reliable local allies in the mountainous region. They offered significant autonomy and privileges to the powerful Druze feudal families (like the Ma'nids or the powerful Druze Shihabi branch) in exchange for their loyalty and control over the mountains. The Druze, in turn, strategically cultivated an ambiguous outward identity, presenting themselves to the Ottomans as "Sunni-adjacent" or "secretly Sunni" within the Islamic fold. This allowed them to escape the jizya (poll tax on non-Muslims) and hold higher administrative positions. Druze feudal lords participated in outward Sunni practices when interacting with Ottoman officials, giving lip service to Ottoman religious pronouncements, and crucially, they were heavily integrated into the iltizām (tax farming) system, solidifying their immense power over the land and its inhabitants. No Ain Dara Exodus: Crucially, the Druze Civil War of Ain Dara (1711 CE in our timeline), which saw significant internal Druze conflict and a mass migration of many Yamani Druze leading to a shift in power towards the Maronites, was either prevented or contained. Ottoman intervention (e.g., backing a favored faction), stronger economic ties to Mount Lebanon, and a lack of a strong "pull factor" from the Hauran region meant that the Druze remained concentrated in their primary heartland. This ensured that Mount Lebanon remained decisively majority Druze throughout the subsequent centuries, solidifying their feudal control. Maronites as Tenants: The Maronites, having migrated to the mountains following the fall of the Crusader states and their urban centers, largely became sharecroppers (fellahīn) or tenant farmers under the Druze feudal lords. Economically dependent on the Druze for access to land, protection, and trade routes, Maronite families paid taxes (in kind or coin) and potentially owed labor service to their Druze lords. The Druze lords, in their nominal Sunni guise, acted as a crucial buffer between the Maronite communities and the direct authority of the Ottoman administration. While the Druze controlled the land and economy, the Maronites retained religious autonomy under their Patriarch, maintaining their own churches and internal religious courts within the Ottoman millet system. This created a unique and often tension-filled, but enduring, symbiosis.

The Legacy: Lebanon as the "Singapore of the Levant"

The fall of Constantinople in 1596, while later, underscored the irreversible shift of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, solidifying Ottoman dominance and ending any lingering hopes of a European Christian counter-offensive. With a history of consistent Shi'a dominance, the absence of the devastating Sunni-Shi'a conflicts of our timeline, and the avoidance of internal sectarian strife like Ain Dara, Lebanon evolved into a remarkably stable and prosperous state. By the modern era, with a population reaching around 7.5 million, it fulfilled its potential as the "Singapore of the Levant"—a thriving commercial and cultural hub, a testament to centuries of diverse coexistence and economic development, free from the ravages of civil war or mass displacement from regional conflicts like the creation of Israel. This alternate history portrays a Lebanon shaped by a unique blend of historical persistence and radical divergence, where ancient faiths and new communities forge a distinct national identity.

Druze Ventures: The Silk Road to Livorno (Early 17th Century and Beyond)

Despite their entrenched feudal power within Mount Lebanon and their strategic alliance with the Ottomans, the leading Druze families were far from insular. The sustained period of prosperity and relative autonomy under their pragmatic Ottoman arrangement, combined with the strategic value of Mount Lebanon as a transit point, fostered a new kind of ambition among the emirs. Inspired by the Ottoman Empire's vast economic reach and the residual echoes of European trade from the Crusader era, certain powerful Druze lords sought to diversify their income beyond agricultural levies and local taxes. This ambition found its most prominent expression in the ventures of figures akin to Fakhr al-Din II al-Ma'ni, a leading Druze emir of the early 17th century. Unlike his historical counterpart, whose European sojourn was an exile born of a rebellious stance against the Ottomans, in this timeline, Fakhr al-Din's extended stay in Tuscany (circa 1610s-1620s) would be framed more as a deliberate diplomatic and commercial mission. Tacitly sanctioned (or at least discreetly tolerated) by the Ottomans, who valued the Druze's stability in the mountains and were keen to observe European affairs, this mission allowed Fakhr al-Din to meticulously study European mercantile practices, banking systems, military technology, and naval logistics. This direct engagement with the Italian city-states—particularly the Medici Grand Duchy of Tuscany and its burgeoning free port of Livorno, but also maintaining channels with pragmatic former Crusader allies like Venice and Genoa—laid the groundwork for a unique Druze trading venture. Direct Market Access: The primary motivation was to bypass intermediaries—whether other Ottoman merchants or even the increasingly dominant Greek Orthodox networks—to directly control the export of Mount Lebanon's prized commodities. This allowed for higher profits and greater leverage over their own economic destiny. Niche High-Value Goods: The Druze networks wouldn't compete directly with the vast bulk trade of the main Ottoman ports. Instead, they would focus on high-value, specialized goods originating from or passing through their mountain territories. Mount Lebanon silk, renowned for its quality, became a cornerstone of this trade, along with specialized olive oils, fine wines, and perhaps even carefully sourced timber or medicinal herbs unique to the Lebanese mountains. Return Flow of European Goods: In return, these Druze trading ventures brought back European manufactured goods, luxury items, and, crucially, technological innovations. While large-scale arms deals might still be too provocative for Ottoman authorities, smaller consignments of advanced tools, specialized machinery (e.g., for silk production), and even architectural or military engineering expertise could find their way into Mount Lebanon via these private channels. Small-Scale Agencies and Representatives: These Druze trading networks were not vast mercantile empires, but rather smaller, highly specialized agencies or representatives established by the leading princely families themselves. These agencies, often managed by trusted Druze agents or even European partners, would handle direct shipments to and from Italian ports. Reinforcing Autonomy and Wealth: While relatively small in volume compared to the overall Levantine trade, these direct European connections provided the Druze emirs with a vital independent source of wealth and influence. It allowed them to invest more in their own mountain infrastructure, bolster their family retinues, and subtly enhance their de facto autonomy within the Ottoman system. It also introduced a limited but consistent stream of European ideas and innovations directly into the heart of Mount Lebanon, further distinguishing its leading families. This enterprise, driven by the powerful Ma'nid family, solidified the Druze's unique position as outwardly compliant Ottoman subjects who nevertheless cultivated an independent economic lifeline to Europe, a testament to their enduring pragmatism and entrepreneurial spirit.

The Greek Fire: Beirut's Revolution and the Ottoman Retaliation (1820s)

By the early 19th century, the Ottoman Empire, though vast, was increasingly seen as the "Sick Man of Europe." Its grip on distant provinces, even those enjoying considerable autonomy like Mount Lebanon, was beginning to loosen. In this alternate timeline, the fervor of the Greek War of Independence, which erupted in 1821, finds a fertile ground in the culturally vibrant and economically prosperous port city of Beirut. Unlike our history, where Beirut was a smaller town and Christian revolts were contained, your alternate Beirut, as the "Singapore of the Levant," boasts a significant and highly Latinized Christian majority (not just a plurality), largely descended from the Franco-Levantines absorbed into the Maronite Church, alongside a robust Greek Orthodox community. These Christians, despite their economic success, still smarted under the jizya tax and the second-class status inherent in Ottoman rule. They were well-aware of the burgeoning European powers and held lingering resentment for the Ottoman conquest of their Crusader forebears. The details of the Greek Revolution's spread to Beirut are as follows:

Mavrovouniotis' Gambit

In 1826, a Greek revolutionary force led by the formidable commander Dimitrios Mavrovouniotis, fresh from successes elsewhere, approaches Beirut by sea. Having cultivated contacts within the city's Christian populace for months, his arrival is a meticulously planned signal.

The Gates Thrown Open

At a predetermined moment, the Christian majority of Beirut, simmering with nationalist and religious fervor, stages a coordinated uprising within the city walls. In a dramatic act of defiance, they overpower the small Ottoman garrison and throw open the city gates to Mavrovouniotis's forces. The city erupts in revolutionary zeal, Ottoman symbols are torn down, and the cross is hoisted over public buildings.

The Pragmatism of the Druze

The relatively small percentage of Druze in Beirut, comprising merchant and landowning families, witnesses the swift and decisive fall of Ottoman authority. Terrified by the ferocity of the Christian uprising and keenly aware of the Ottoman Empire's declining fortunes (and the potential for severe Christian reprisals if they sided wrongly), they make a cold, calculated decision. Once it's clear Mavrovouniotis's forces are winning, these city-dwelling Druze side with the Greek fighting force, offering their support and resources to curry favor with the new masters of Beirut. This immediate alignment, while a pragmatic survival tactic, would be a stark contrast to their mountain brethren.

The Shia Uprising

The Shia communities of Jabal Amil and the Beqaa Valley, who had also long chafed under Ottoman suzerainty and resented the Sunni-dominated administration, seize this moment of chaos. Inspired by the success in Beirut and sensing the Ottoman weakness, they too throw off the Ottoman yoke, declaring their own local autonomy and refusing to acknowledge Ottoman authority or pay taxes. This isn't necessarily an alignment with the Greeks, but a separate, opportunistic rebellion born of shared anti-Ottoman sentiment.

The Ottoman Counter-Attack and Beirut's Stand

The Sublime Porte, enraged by this audacious revolt, swiftly dispatches a large counter-attack force to retake Beirut. However, the city's gates are now firmly shut against them. The combined Christian and city-Druze defenders, bolstered by Greek military expertise and the sheer revolutionary fervor, manage to hold the strategically vital port. The Ottomans, unable to easily breach the city's defenses, are forced into a prolonged siege, diverting significant resources. The simultaneous uprisings of the Shia in the south and the strict neutrality of the Druze in Mount Lebanon act as a crucial bulwark, preventing the Ottomans from bringing their full might to bear on Beirut, drawing away forces, and disrupting supply lines.

Beirut's Revolutionary Council and the Betrayal

For a crucial couple of years, Beirut breathes free under a nascent self-administration. This period sees the formation of a truly unique Revolutionary Council of Beirut, an unprecedented experiment in multi-confessional governance. Representatives from the city's diverse fabric – Greek Orthodox, Maronite (Latinized) Catholic, Latin Catholic (from remaining prominent families), city-dwelling Druze, Armenian Uniate, Twelver Shia, and even Ismaili Shia (representing the lingering Fatimid heritage) – convene to chart the city's future. This brief era of shared governance fosters a remarkable, if ephemeral, flourishing of unity in literature and culture. Pamphlets, revolutionary songs, and fiery speeches articulate a Roman identity (Ρωμιοσύνη/الرومية/Romanitas) that transcends traditional sectarian lines, emphasizing shared struggle and common future. Early attempts at drafting a municipal constitution or declarations of rights for a liberated Beirut are circulated, written in a blend of Arabic and Greek, with French as a key diplomatic language. The idea of a truly pluralistic society, even if confined to the city's walls, becomes a powerful symbol. However, this hopeful interlude is shattered by the machinations of Great Power diplomacy. At the subsequent Treaty negotiations (which would consolidate Greek independence), involving English, French, Russian, Greek, and Ottoman representatives, "perfidious Albion" (England) notoriously betrays the Greek cause in the Levant. In a cynical display of realpolitik, London orchestrates a deal: the nascent Greek state gains the strategically valuable islands of Crete and the Dodecanese, but in return, Beirut is nominally "returned" to Ottoman suzerainty. In reality, this diplomatic maneuver serves as a thinly veiled pretext for England's economic takeover of Beirut. Almost immediately, the powerful English Levantine Company (a re-imagined or enhanced version of historical British trading interests) establishes itself as a virtual state-within-a-state in the recaptured city. Its agents, backed by British naval power and consular influence, effectively call the shots in Beirut's commerce, customs, and even local administration, rendering the Ottoman authorities powerless to stop them. This profound betrayal by the English ignites furious anti-English sentiment and riots not only in Beirut itself, but also across the newly independent Greece (particularly in Athens), which feels used and discarded. In Beirut, this resentment runs deep through the Christian communities, who had so bravely rebelled, and even among the city-Druze who had allied with the Greeks. To further complicate the local dynamic, the British pragmatically identify the city's Sunni Muslim population – who had largely remained aloof from the Greek-led Christian uprising – as their natural proxies. The Sunnis, eager to regain influence and escape the perceived Christian dominance, readily align with the English economic power, setting the stage for future internal tensions within Beirut.

A New Wave of Persecution

This period marks a complete 180-degree turn in Ottoman policy towards its non-Sunni subjects in the Levant. The relatively tolerant approach is abandoned. A new wave of intense persecution begins, targeting Christians (especially the Latinized Maronites and the rebelling Orthodox), but also the Shi'a and the Druze, who are now seen as unreliable and disloyal. The old feudal arrangements are deemed failures, leading to attempts at direct Ottoman control, heavy taxation, and a suppression of religious freedoms.

The Great Levantine Uprising and the Mandate's Dawn (GWI)

This brutal shift in Ottoman policy fosters a deep-seated, shared grievance across the diverse communities of Mount Lebanon and the cities. The memory of the Ottoman "betrayal" of their established autonomies unites them in a way few other events could. A Unified Front: When World War I erupts in the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire finds itself on the side of the Central Powers. This provides the long-awaited opportunity. Instead of internal sectarian strife, the heavy-handed Ottoman repression, combined with wartime privations and widespread famine, ignites a united uprising of all faiths on Mount Lebanon and in Beirut. Maronite, Orthodox, Druze, and Shia communities, having suffered decades of renewed persecution, rise up in concert against their common oppressor. Violent Overthrow: This is not a gentle push for independence. It's a violent overthrow of Ottoman authority, fueled by generations of resentment and the desire for true self-determination. Local militias, hardened by years of resistance, coordinate with Allied forces. The Ottoman garrisons in Beirut and the mountain districts are systematically defeated and expelled, often with significant bloodshed.

Formation of the French Mandate

With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI, the Allied powers redraw the map of the Middle East. The long-standing French interest in the Levant, particularly its historical ties to the Maronites (now profoundly Latinized and viewed as France's "clients"), combined with the unified uprising and the strategic importance of Beirut, culminates in the formation of a French Mandate over Lebanon (and Syria). This mandate, while externally imposed, is initially met with a complex mix of relief (at the Ottoman's defeat) and wary expectation by the diverse communities who have fought together for liberation. It sets the stage for a unique Lebanese state, born from multi-confessional revolt. This dramatic narrative arc creates a compelling alternate history for Lebanon, transforming its trajectory from autonomy under Ottomans to a fierce, unified struggle for liberation.

Geography

North: Syria.
West: Mediterranean Sea.
South: Palestine.
East: Syria.

A Mosaicked Levant: Demography and the Sectarian Geography of Alternate Lebanon (c. 19th-20th Century)

In IB, the unique forces that shaped Lebanon have resulted in a demographic landscape distinct from our own. With a population approaching 7.5 million by the modern era, the country is defined by clear regional majorities and significant, deeply interwoven minorities.

Mount Lebanon: The Heartland of Divergence

The Mount Lebanon range itself, a series of parallel mountain chains running roughly north-to-south, forms the traditional heartland of the Lebanese state. Its geographic definition broadly covers the modern Lebanese governorates of Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon (for its mountain segments), and parts of South Lebanon and the Beqaa Valley that historically comprised the Emirate of Mount Lebanon. Within this mountain system, the dominant demographic pattern is largely due to the sustained Druze feudal rule and the massive absorption of Franco-Levantines into the Maronite Church. 1.) Northern Mount Lebanon (Maronite Stronghold): The rugged, high peaks and valleys of the north, including modern districts like Bsharri, Zgharta,and Batroun remain the undisputed heartland of the Maronite Church. Here, the mountainous terrain provided a natural refuge from external powers, and the initial Maronite population was sufficiently large to absorb the influx of Latinized Franco-Levantines without losing their numerical dominance. These areas are overwhelmingly Maronite majority, though with established pockets of Greek Orthodox communities, particularly in Koura (from the Greek word «χώρα,» meaning "country"). There is not a single Maronite church and not one Maronite family originating from the 15km stretch of land in Koura between Amioun & the Mediterranean Sea. This religious border has not changed in 1200 years. Population (approximate): By only a hair's breadth, Maronites constitute the largest singular Christian sect in Lebanon, with their densest populations here. 2.) Keserwan (Shia Ascent): A significant divergence from our timeline, the Keserwan district (historically a Maronite stronghold) becomes a Twelver Shia majority. The absence of the Mamluk-led massacres of 1260, which severely depopulated Shia communities in the area in our history, allowed Twelver Shiism to persist and flourish in this fertile coastal and lower mountain region. While pockets of Maronites and other Christians exist, Keserwan is distinctly a Twelver Shia majority. 3.) Central Mount Lebanon (Druze Core): Districts such as the Matn, Aley, Chouf, Hasbaya, and Rashaya form the political and demographic heartland of the Druze community. As the dominant feudal lords, the Druze maintained their majority through centuries of uninterrupted control and a strengthened demographic base. These areas are decisively Druze majority, with significant Maronite and Greek Orthodox minorities, often living as tenant farmers or in distinct villages under Druze overlordship. Population (approximate): Druze are a major force, numbering around 1.3 million here.

Jezzine (Mixed but Druze Influenced)

While traditionally having a strong Maronite presence, Jezzine, as a southern district within the Druze sphere of influence, would exhibit a Druze majority in its rural parts, with a significant Maronite minority in the town itself and certain villages. Regional Demographics Across Lebanon Beyond Mount Lebanon, the country's religious map is equally distinct:

Beirut (Christian Plurality/Majority)

As the "Singapore of the Levant," Beirut is a bustling cosmopolitan port. Its population would be a Christian majority/plurality, with a particularly strong Maronite presence due to the massive influx and absorption of the Franco-Levantines, alongside a very substantial Greek Orthodox community. There would be significant Sunni Muslim minorities (including those Franco-Levantines who converted to Islam for economic gain) and smaller Druze communities (the urban ones who pragmatically sided with the Greek revolutionaries). Various other Christian minorities (Armenian, Melkite, Syriac) would also be present. Population (approximate): Greek Orthodox are substantial at around 1.0 million (13.3%) nationally, with a strong presence in Beirut. Sunnis are around 1.0 million (13.3%) nationally.

North Lebanon (excluding northern Mount Lebanon)

Tripoli (City): Remains a plurality Twelver Shia Muslim majority city with a powerful Sunni contingency as it served as a major port and administrative center for the Ottoman Empire's northern reach. It would have significant Greek Orthodox and Alawite minorities. Akkar (Northernmost Region): A diverse mix, likely with an overall Sunni Muslim majority, but with substantial Christian (Maronite and Greek Orthodox) and Alawite minorities, particularly in the northern reaches bordering the Alawite mountains of Syria.

Beqaa Valley (Central and Southern)

Northern Beqaa (Baalbek-Hermel): Overwhelmingly Twelver Shia majority. This region, historically a Shia heartland, would have seen its population solidify and expand due to the continuous presence of Shia leadership and the absence of later Ottoman Sunni repressions that occurred in our timeline. Sunni and Christian minorities would exist. Central Beqaa (Zahle/Qabb Elias): This fertile plain would be a Christian majority, particularly Greek Orthodox, benefiting from its agricultural wealth and historical connections. Significant Sunni and Shia minorities. Western Beqaa: A mixed zone, leaning towards a Druze majority due to its proximity to the Chouf and their feudal expansion, with significant Shia and Sunni minorities. Population (approximate): Twelver Shia are a formidable force, numbering roughly 1.8 million (24%) nationally, with their densest populations here and in South Lebanon.

South Lebanon (Jabal Amil)

Jabal Amil: This region south of the Litani River would be an overwhelmingly Twelver Shia majority. The consistent Shia presence and expansion through centuries of Fatimid rule (and no Mamluk purges) ensured its demographic consolidation. Tyre and Sidon (Cities): While the surrounding countryside is Shia for both cities, Tyre would likely retain very slim Sunni Muslim majority. Both served as key administrative and commercial centers under Ottoman rule and have a Christian Orthodox (Rûm) minority.

Beyond the Borders of Lebanon: Shi'ism's Southern Penetration into Palestine

Given the uninterrupted Fatimid influence, the growth of Twelver Shi'ism in the Levant, and the absence of Mamluk purges that significantly reduced Shia populations in historical Palestine, Shi'ism would indeed penetrate much further south into the Galilee region than in our timeline. 1.) Upper Galilee: It is highly plausible that Shia communities would constitute a significant minority or even a local majority in specific clusters of villages within the mountainous and rural areas of the Upper Galilee. Areas around Safed and portions of the Western Galilee highlands would likely retain or develop a strong Twelver Shia presence. These would be rural, agrarian communities, leveraging the rugged terrain for protection and cultural distinctiveness. *No Urban Dominance*: While influential, it's unlikely Shi'ism would dominate major coastal cities like Acre or Haifa, which would remain diverse but primarily Sunni/Christian mixed due to their roles as port cities under Ottoman administration. *Cultural Mark*: The presence of Shia communities extending into historical Palestine would create a unique religious and cultural link between Southern Lebanon and Northern Palestine, a "Shia corridor" of sorts, distinct from the Sunni heartlands further south. This fleshed-out demographic and geographic map provides a rich backdrop for the later developments, particularly the multi-confessional uprising against the Ottomans in WWI, emphasizing the varied interests and shared grievances that ultimately united the Lebanese in their struggle.

Economy

RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE NATION'S ECONOMICAL SECTOR, EXPORTED PRODUCTS, ETC...

Culture

RELEVANT ASPECTS OF THE NATION'S CULTURE

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